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SHARING THE BURDEN OF EBOLA
VACCINE-RELATED ADVERSE EVENTS
On December 9, 2014, United States Secretary of Health and Human Services Sylvia Burwell issued a declaration under
the U.S. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act to provide immunity from legal claims related to
manufacturing, testing, development, distribution, and administration of three candidate Ebola vaccines. 1 At an earlier
meeting of major stakeholders held at the World Health Organization (WHO), the management of legal liabilities related to
vaccines was an important subject of the global response to Ebola addressed by national governments, the World Bank, and
others. 2 That discussion, however, has faded as the epidemic has been brought under control even as clinical trials for vaccine
candidates commence. 3 This Essay argues that planning for the management of adverse event costs associated with rapidly
developed vaccines is in fact a critical opportunity in public health emergency preparedness and recommends six options
available to governments of countries afflicted by outbreaks of infectious disease, governments in countries where vaccines
are likely to be developed, major global vaccine manufacturers, and major third-party sponsors such as the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI Alliance), the World Bank, and WHO.
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Authorities
5. Declarations of Immunity by Supporting and Beneficiary Governments
6. Contractual Indemnities Provided by Third-Party Procurement Entities or Supporting
Governments
III. CONCLUSION

132
134
134
135
136
137
138
138
139
139
140
141

*132 I. INTRODUCTION
There are real and perceived liability risks of adverse events relating to Ebola vaccines. The challenge facing partners
in the Ebola response is to allocate, whether explicitly by action or implicitly by nonaction, such liability risks
between vaccine manufacturers, supporting governments, beneficiary governments (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone),
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individuals who may experience adverse events, and populations in the affected countries and elsewhere who will benefit
from widespread vaccination.
This challenge is compounded by the fact that such risks and accompanying legal liabilities are difficult to project in
advance, are based upon imperfect information, and are potential precedents for treatment of liability risks in future
public health emergencies. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have histories of relatively weak judicial systems, which
increase the potential legal risks. 4 Even in the context of stronger judicial systems, there is no way to effectively assess
how large liability exposure might be. Liability for GlaxoSmithKline's ASO3-adjuvanted pandemic influenza vaccines
during the 2009 H1N1 episode ran into the tens of millions of dollars if not more. 5 The influenza vaccine is generally
manufactured according to well-known processes and over its life enjoys a strong safety profile. There are, by contrast,
few, if any, licensed vaccines based on current approaches to Ebola *133 vaccine development. Ebola vaccines will
potentially be administered to a large population after limited development and unusual circumstances.
In most countries, a plaintiff (whether individual or governmental) is required to prove causation between an injury and
the vaccination that preceded it. The method by which causation is established under products liability law differs in
key respects from the accepted method of establishing causation in science and medicine. In law, there is generally no
requirement that a decision maker, typically a judge, apply a scientific standard to the causation determination, only
that some evidence exists to support a finding of causation.
If supporting governments accept all liabilities for adverse events attributed to Ebola vaccines, they are potentially
responsible for substantial claims that might erode their credibility when undertaking future vaccination or accessto-medicines programs. On the other hand, effective risk-sharing may set a useful precedent for future public health
emergencies. There is a public health preparedness value in agreeing to compensate individuals through predefined
legal or regulatory mechanisms. In the vaccination context generally, the traditional argument is that the public health
benefits of vaccination so far outweigh the risks that we, as a community, compensate individuals who pay the price in
experiencing adverse events. The argument is also true for public health emergencies where rapid response to an evolving
threat in the face of imperfect information counsels toward aggressive action.
From the standpoint of vaccine manufacturers, the risks associated with potential legal liability cannot be fully separated
from other more general business risks and opportunities:
(1) Under prevailing legal norms, product manufacturers are expected to pay for injuries caused by their
products, which in the case of rapidly developed medicines may result in potentially substantial liability;

(2) The perception that a firm's vaccines may be unsafe or cause injury may threaten its reputation across
multiple product lines; and

(3) Firms compete globally, and there is a strong incentive for firms to produce the first safe and effective
Ebola vaccine given the potential market likely to be formed by governments seeking to secure access to an
Ebola vaccine as part of their health security preparedness plans.
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This Essay focuses specifically on vaccine injury, a specific type of product liability that is likely to subject manufacturers
to “litigation risk,” i.e., the possibility that legal action will be taken because of a defendant's *134 actions, inactions,
products, services or other events. It outlines preliminary options for addressing manufacturers' litigation risk for injuries
attributed to experimental Ebola vaccines.
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY AND EBOLA VACCINES
“Products liability” refers to any action against a manufacturer or seller for recovery of damages arising out of personal
injury, death, or property damage allegedly caused by a defective product. For vaccine manufacturers, litigation risk for
product liability attaches any time there is an association between an injury suffered by a recipient and the place, time,
and specifics of the vaccine administration. These risks are particularly relevant for manufacturers because, even if the
injury is wrongly associated with the vaccination, the manufacturer must nevertheless incur costs in reputation, time,
and money to establish the falsity of the allegation.
Liability will depend upon the laws applied by the court hearing the case. Key questions as to jurisdiction, choice of law,
venue, and enforceability of judgments are complex and will depend upon the facts of particular cases. Moreover, the
rapid circumstances under which current Ebola vaccine candidates have been or are being developed have necessarily
compressed typical drug development protocols. The window to discover adverse events will be narrower for Ebola
vaccines, raising the risk that delayed adverse events may not be revealed until a mass vaccination campaign is already
underway.
A. Real and Unknown Risks
Even vaccines that are generally regarded as safe and effective will still typically generate adverse events among those
inoculated, ranging from (common) soreness at the injection site, to fever, discomfort, and muscle pain, to more
serious problems like seizures, severe allergic reactions, and brain damage. 6 On December 11, 2014, the MerckNewLink experimental Ebola vaccine (rVSV-ZEBOV) phase 1 trial was temporarily suspended because four of fiftynine participants reported joint pain in the hands and feet, both delayed-onset and away from the injection site. 7 The
candidate vaccine (cAd3-ZEBOV) developed by *135 GlaxoSmithKline and the United States National Institute for
Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID) showed a mild, adverse event for some participants at a high dose. 8
B. Perceived and Falsely Attributed Risks
In many developing countries, including Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, there have been campaigns asserting that
vaccines may cause sterility or other adverse health effects. 9 Such campaigns fuel suspicions that firms from developed
countries use people as unwitting human subjects for research for a range of self-serving or even nefarious objectives.
There have, in fact, been instances of improper human subject research in developing countries which influence these
views. 10 For a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this Essay, there are fears and rumors associated with vaccination
campaigns and the testing of new medical products in many communities in the developing world. Indeed, common
rumors in the three most Ebola-affected countries link the outbreak with preexisting vaccination drives and the presence
of clinical trials in the region sponsored by pharmaceutical companies. 11
Establishing causation will be a key element of any action to recover money damages in the context of Ebola vaccines.
Litigation risk is far more significant for perceived injuries or false attribution of background events to a vaccination.
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The beneficiary countries suffer from high background levels of morbidity and mortality, and coincidental deaths and
injuries associated with vaccine administration may give rise to liability, even if objective data ultimately vindicates a
manufacturer and its product. Similarly, vaccine-related injuries may be attributable to contamination or infection from
vaccines or improperly used syringes, a risk that increases in low resource countries without the infrastructure to ensure
proper handling, storage, distribution, and administration from facility to recipient.
*136 C. Risk-Sharing Mechanisms
Product liability plays a large role in global public health emergency responses. In 2006, the IFPMA issued a statement
in the wake of a potential H5N1 pandemic:
[I]n some countries, existing pharmacovigilance systems may fail to detect key signals until after the vaccines
have already been administered to hundreds or thousands or millions of people. Many of the individuals
vaccinated could develop medical conditions, by chance alone and unrelated to the vaccine, at some point
following vaccination. It is inevitable that many will expect to be compensated. This is why [IFPMA] call(s)
for a waiver of liability for the manufacturing and use of pandemic vaccines. 12
In the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, manufacturers restated their concerns with potential product liability suits. In fact,
negotiations regarding indemnification for manufacturers caused substantial delays. 13

Manufacturers have expressed similar concerns with respect to Ebola vaccines under development. 14 Some jurisdictions,
like the United States, have extended immunity against legal claims related to the manufacturing, testing, development,
distribution, and administration of Ebola vaccines. 15 But even where such legal authorizations apply, they do not
generally provide immunity for a claim brought in a court outside that country. 16 Nor, of course, does immunity provide
any relief for individuals harmed by vaccines administered as part of public health campaigns that respond to public
health emergencies. 17
Product liability, therefore, figures prominently in manufacturers' risk assessments, and it is on product liability that we
will focus our discussion of potential mechanisms or processes that may ameliorate *137 liability concerns if partners in
the Ebola response wish to address these matters. We note at the outset that there are at least nineteen national, no-fault
compensation regimes for adverse events attributed to vaccination, all of which are in well-resourced jurisdictions. 18
We assume for purposes of this Essay that establishing similar regimes in target jurisdictions will be prohibitive due to
resource constraints. Nevertheless, there are aspects of these regimes that inform our analysis of possible risk-sharing
mechanisms.
1. Liability Remains with Manufacturer
Before considering risk-sharing and reallocating mechanisms, the global health community should assess the relationship
between indemnification and the likelihood that the absence of a risk-sharing or reallocating mechanisms will deter
or delay manufacturer participation. Before the current outbreak, manufacturers identified the market potential of
being a first-mover on an effective Ebola vaccine. 19 Seeking to do so makes sense for both low-income and developed
country procurement markets. GAVI has established a $300 million dollar procurement fund for a WHO-approved
Ebola vaccine. 20 Moreover, there remains the possibility that manufacturers may be able to negotiate coverage of some
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sort from their traditional insurers. Similarly, while risk-shifting regimes are advantageous in minimizing the likelihood
of delay or deterrence of manufacturer participation, they also signal that a manufacturer may lack confidence in its
product and that it regards the chances of an adverse event as significant enough to seek maximum indemnity for
such occurrences. Indeed, such broad protection could feed into already existing suspicions that European and North
American firms are inappropriately or illegally testing their products on people in developing countries. Partners in the
global Ebola response should assess whether mitigating or sharing liability is necessary or desirable as a threshold matter.
*138 2. Risk Sharing Between Beneficiary Governments and Manufacturers
If conventional insurance markets are not available or optimal for covering Ebola vaccine injury liabilities,
manufacturers and procuring governments may enter into their own variations on existing insurance compensation
schedules in place for pharmaceutical or other product sectors. For example, manufacturers could agree to pay up to a
per claim limit as well as an aggregate limit for claims in a given jurisdiction with the beneficiary government (potentially
supported by a multilateral agency or group of supporting governments) promising to pay any compensation above the
designated individual or aggregate claims. Similarly, beneficiary governments may establish specific criteria (consistent
with their constitutional principles) for which burden sharing is appropriate. For example, manufacturers may agree
to compensate for “severe” injuries, injuries based on a period or level of disability, medical costs only, or perhaps
other noneconomic losses. 21 Some relevant models for this kind of risk sharing may be found in UNICEF procurement
agreements which, depending on vaccine and registration, shift liabilities between the manufacturer and the beneficiary
government. 22 UNICEF and third-party financing entities are generally fully indemnified. 23 A second set of relevant
models may be found in multilateral agreements addressing indemnification for national security or emergency vaccine
deployments like smallpox. 24
3. Multilateral Agency or Supporting Government Approach
The World Bank, or a group of willing, supporting governments, may agree to cover any liabilities arising from vaccine
injuries. Aside from the logistical questions that will confront a multilateral agency or supporting governments as to
how claims are established, how losses and compensation are calculated, and what administrative body will be charged
with undertaking those determinations, this approach requires either that manufacturers defend themselves initially and
then seek *139 reimbursement or that the supporting organization or group be substituted as the proper party as a
threshold matter in any legal action.
4. Risk Mitigation Through Disclosure and Government Recommendations to Judicial Authorities
The principal litigation risk manufacturers face is the possibility of an individual or governmental party bringing suit
against it for one of the aforementioned legal bases of liability in a judicial system with which the manufacturer is
unfamiliar and/or whose processes may not be as transparent or well-resourced as in its home jurisdiction. This risk may
be mitigated if manufacturers are given clear bases for liability in a given jurisdiction and are promised by beneficiary
governments to appear in judicial proceedings to explain the reasons for deployment of vaccines. By lending a promise
to participate in judicial processes, beneficiary governments may give manufacturers at least some assurance (indeed,
relatively low cost assurance) that the beneficiary government will appear to explain legal positions. In the GAVI
context, this may be encouraged by including ministries of justice (as well as ministries of health and finance) in country
procurement plans or clarifying the ability of ministries of health and finance to appear in court to articulate government
positions in specific cases. This has the additional benefit of allowing governmental legal experts the opportunity to
present and shape epidemiological and medical evidence as courts and other tribunals are accustomed to hearing it.
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5. Declarations of Immunity by Supporting and Beneficiary Governments
Taking as a model the U.S. declaration of immunity, under U.S. law for legal claims related to the manufacturing, testing,
development, distribution, and administration of specified vaccines for the Ebola virus, allow beneficiary governments
and supporting governments issue similar declarations pursuant to whichever statutory and regulatory frameworks
might serve as bases to circumscribe, limit, or prohibit litigation based on Ebola vaccine injury. 25 This option is
complex, not only because of the internal constitutional and statutory process that may need to mobilize in support
of such a declaration, but because judicial or administrative authorities in jurisdictions which lack clear authority for
such declarations may deem those acts void under law. Externally (and *140 relatedly) if beneficiary and supporting
governments do not issue relatively uniform declarations in relatively similar timeframes, it may open additional areas
of legal uncertainty.
6. Contractual Indemnities Provided by Third-Party Procurement Entities or Supporting Governments
It is also possible to construct a regime that is entirely or almost entirely risk shifting from manufacturers to procuring
governments or to third parties through the procurement agreements themselves. This was effectively the approach
adopted for donations and discounted sales of vaccines by manufacturers during the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic as well
as fully commercial sales to high-income countries. 26 Manufacturers agreed to produce vaccines under the condition
that all supporting governments indemnify them from liability “for any adverse events arising from the use of pandemic
H1N1 vaccine, except to the extent that such adverse events were caused by a failure to comply with cGMP or to meet
agreed specifications.” 27 This would effectively expand current measures by some governments, like the United States,
to shield manufacturers from liability and to effectively cover similar judgments arising in other jurisdictions. As a
practical matter, this may end up in negotiated agreements with beneficiary governments where a lump payment is paid
to discharge all claims for individuals a beneficiary government represents. 28 This arrangement is supported by a long
set of international legal precedent.
As the aforementioned discussion noted, such comprehensive promises of indemnification may be both expensive for
supporting governments and erode their credibility in attempting to undertake other public health support or emergency
measures in the future. Additionally, *141 a preexisting promise of indemnity may increase meritless claims as well as
reduce the optimal risk manufacturers should bear.
III. CONCLUSION
There are legal risks involved with the current vaccine development effort that is now under way that need to be managed
by the relevant actors in the response to the Ebola outbreak in the beneficiary countries. The lack of a global plan for legal
risk means a solution must be cobbled together at each step in the response when it is precisely the kind of predictable,
resolvable issue that lends itself to advance planning. Doing so provides an opportunity for the global community to
use the current Ebola vaccine development and distribution effort as a precedent for dealing with related issues in future
global emergencies.

Footnotes
a1

Sam Halabi, Associate Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law and Scholar, O'Neill Institute for National and Global
Health Law, Georgetown University.

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

6

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

SHARING THE BURDEN OF EBOLA VACCINE-RELATED..., 24 Tul. J. Int'l &...

d1

Senior Advisor for Global Health to Georgetown University President John J DeGioia; Senior Fellow, McCourt School of
Public Policy; and Senior Scholar, O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law.

1

Notice of Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,314 (Dec. 10, 2014).

2

World Health Org. [WHO], Summary Report of a WHO High-Level Meeting on Ebola Vaccines Access and Financing, at 2, 7
(Oct. 23, 2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/137184/1/WHO_EVD_Meet_EMP_14.2_eng.pdf?ua=1.

3

Sarah Boseley, Experimental Ebola Vaccine Shipped to Liberia, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2015, 5:34 EST), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/23/ebola-vaccine-liberia-gsk-glaxosmithkline-trials.

4

United Nations Dev. Programme [UNDP], Improving Access to Justice in Sierra Leone, at 3 (2009) http://www.sl.undp.org/
content/dam/sierraleone/docs/projectdocuments/demgov/undp_sle_A2Jprodoc.pdf; Report of the Special Adviser to the
Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide on His Mission to Guinea from 7 to 22 March 2010, at 1 (2010), http://
www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_mission_report_guinea_mar_2010.pdf.

5

Nick Paul Taylor, Report: U.K. Facing $100M Compensation Payout Relating to GSK's Swine Flu Vaccine, FIERCE
VACCINES (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.fiercevaccines.com/story/report-uk-facing-100m-compensation-payout-relatinggsks-swine-flu-vaccine/2014-03-04.

6

Possible Side-Effects from Vaccines, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/
side-effects.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).

7

Joanna Lyford, Ebola Clinical Trial Suspended After Volunteers Complain of Joint Pains, PHARMACEUTICAL J. (Dec.
12, 2014), http://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/news-and-analysis/news/ebola-clinical-trial-suspended-after-volunteerscomplain-of-joint-pains/20067418.article.

8

NIAID/GSK Experimental Ebola Vaccine Appears Safe, Prompts Immune Response, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH (Nov. 28,
2014), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/nov2014/niaid-28.htm.

9

James Fairchild, Melissa Leach & Mary Small, Childhood Vaccination and Society in the Gambia: Public Engagement with
Science and Delivery 4 (Inst. of Dev. Stud., Working Paper No. 218, Jan. 2004), http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp218.pdf.

10

Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethical Review of Research Involving Human Subjects in Nigeria: Legal and Policy Issues, 14 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 88-89 (2003-2004).

11

Yoichi Shimatsu, The Ebola Outbreak Coincided with UN Vaccine Campaigns, LIBER. OBSERVER (Oct. 9, 2014), http://
www.liberianobserver.com/commentaries/ebola-breakout-coincided-un-vaccine-campaigns.

12

Int'l Fed'n of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Ass'ns [IFPMA], Pandemic Influenza Vaccines and Liability
Protection for Manufacturers (May 19, 2006), http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Global%20Health/Influenza/
Ref_56_IFPMA_IVS_Request_on_Liability_May_19_2006.pdf.

13

WHO, Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations, (2005) in Relation to
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, A64/10 (May 5, 2011), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA64/A64_10-en.pdf?ua=1.

14

Id.

15

Notice of Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,314 (Dec. 10, 2014).

16

HHS Notice of Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, supra note 1.

17

Peggy Binzer, The PREP Act: Liability Protection for Medical Countermeasure Development, Distribution and Administration,
6 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 1 (2008), http://www.wcsr.com/
resources/pdfs/binzer_120709.pdf (noting that PREP Act only applies in the United States).

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

7

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

SHARING THE BURDEN OF EBOLA VACCINE-RELATED..., 24 Tul. J. Int'l &...

18

Clare Looker & Heath Kelly, No-Fault Compensation Following Adverse Events Attributed to Vaccination: A Review
of International Programmes, 89 BULL. OF THE WHO 317, 317 (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.who.int/bulletin/
volumes/89/5/10-081901/en/.

19

MICHAEL KREMER & RACHEL GLENNERSTER, STRONG MEDICINE: CREATING INCENTIVES FOR
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH ON NEGLECTED DISEASES 38 (2004) (describing first-mover advantage in vaccine
markets and circumstances under which that advantage will help innovators).

20

Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization [GAVI], GAVI Commits to Purchasing Ebola Vaccine for
Affected Countries (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.gavi.org/Library/News/Press-releases/2014/Gavi-commits-to-purchasingebola-vaccine-for-affected-countries/.

21

Looker & Kelly, supra note 18.

22

United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF], Request for Proposal: United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Wishes
To Receive Proposals for Inactivated Polio Vaccine (IPV), RFP-DAN-2013-501729 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.unicef.org/
videoaudio/PDFs/RFP_DAN_2013_501729.pdf.

23

WHO, Operational Framework for Monovalent Oral Poliovirus Type 2 (mOPV2) Deployment and Replenishment
(During the Endgame Period), arts. 15-16 (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.who.int/immunization/sage/meetings/2014/
october/4_Polio_mOPV2_stockpile_v4_09_10_2014.pdf.

24

See, e.g., id.

25

Notice of Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,314 (Dec. 10, 2014).

26

Sam F. Halabi, Obstacles to pH1N1 Vaccine Availability: The Complex Contracting Relationship Between Vaccine
Manufacturers, WHO, Donor and Beneficiary Governments, THE PUB. HEALTH RESPONSE TO 2009 H1N1 (2015), http://
digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1469&context=fac_pub.

27

WHO, Report of the WHO Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) Vaccine Deployment Initiative, at 9 (2009), http://www.who.int/
influenza_vaccines_plan/resources/h1n1_deployment_report.pdf.

28

Letter from Maxim Litvinov to the President of the United States of America (Nov. 16, 1933), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
coldwar/documents/episodes-1/fdr-ml.htm; Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria Relating to the Commitments made by Iran and the United States, 20 I.L.M. 223, 1 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 1981);
Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223, 9 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 1981).

24 TLNJICL 131
End of Document

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government
Works.

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

8

